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This paper proposes a stochastic congestion and pricing model that combines a bottleneck model 
with stochastic queuing to study roadway congestion and pricing. Employing this model, two 
pricing schemes are developed: one is omniscient pricing for which the transportation 
administrative agency is assumed to be aware of each and every traveler’s cost structure (i.e., their 
detailed valuation of journey cost as well as early and late penalties), and the other is observable 
pricing, for which only queuing delay is considered.  Travelers are characterized by their late-
acceptance level and the effects of various compositions of late-averse, late-tolerant and late-
neutral travelers on congestion patterns with and without pricing are discussed.  Numerical 
simulation indicates that omniscient pricing scheme is most effective in suppressing peak hour 
congestion and distributing demands over longer time horizon. Also, congestion pricing is found to 
be more effective when travelers have diversified cost structures than identical cost structures, and 
congestion is better reduced with heterogeneous traveler composition than with single composition. 
This is consistent with earlier studies in the literature. In addition, the simulation results indicate 
that omniscient pricing in general reduces Expected Total Social Cost (with or without the return 
of the congestion fee). However, the ultimate benefits of a certain pricing scheme depend on 
travelers’ cost structure as well as the composition of late-tolerant, late-averse and late-neutral 
travelers in the entire population; extreme situations such as 100% late-averse or 100% late-
tolerant traveler composition deserves extra attention when analyzing different pricing schemes. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Traffic congestion is one of the most frustrating problems in both freight and passenger 
transportation. Over the years a number of models have been developed separately with different 
aims, trying to bring out the issues involved as clearly as possible. Broadly speaking these models 
can be classified as econometric models, queuing theoretic models, game theoretic models and 
bottleneck models. Specifically, econometric models employ time-dependent demand and delay 
functions with crude specifications of queue evolution, while queuing theoretic models introduced 
stochastic queue evolutions but generally considered the arrival rates as exogenous variables 
irrelevant to equilibrium fees (Daniel 1992). Game theoretic models were mostly applied to 
explain behaviors in conflicting situations, e.g. (Kita 1999; Marcucci and Marini 2003), while a 
recent game-theoretic model developed by Levinson explored the “micro-foundations” of 
congestion and pricing considering the interactions of departure strategies of two or more travelers 
(Levinson 2005). Vickrey developed the first bottleneck model to study the efficiency gains and 
temporal distribution of departure times resulted from congestion pricing (Vickrey 1969). The 
principal innovation of Vickrey’s bottleneck model was that individual departure times were 
endogenized and the evolution of congestion over the rush hour can be determined within the 
model itself (Arnott et al. 1998). Several researchers extended the original bottleneck model in a 
number of directions. Smith gave a general proof of the existence of no-fee single bottleneck 
equilibrium (Smith 1984) while Daganzo showed that Smith’s equilibrium is unique (Daganzo 
1985). Henderson improved the Vickrey model by modifying the deterministic queuing process 
with a form of random flow congestion (Henderson 1985); Ben-Akiva et al. developed a dynamic 
adjustments model of commuters and tested various model parameters (Ben-Akiva et al. 1984). 
Moreover, Arnott et al. developed a network model of parallel routes and analyzed the efficiency 
gains of step tolls instead of continuously varying tolls (Arnott et al. 1990). Recently,  Daniel 
combined Vickrey’s bottleneck model with queuing theoretic model and developed a hybrid model 
for airport operations that captures the stochastic nature of arrivals and inter-temporal adjustments 
of scheduled arrival time as a result of congestion pricing (Daniel 1992; Daniel 1995; Daniel 2001).  
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In this paper, a stochastic congestion and pricing model is proposed combining a bottleneck model 
with stochastic queuing for studying roadway congestion and pricing using an N-player game to 
model driver interactions. In this model, there is a single destination and travelers’ desired arrival 
time are assumed to be uniformly distributed. Each traveler selects the “best” departure time that 
minimizes his total travel cost, which is the sum of journey cost, early and late penalties plus a 
congestion toll.  Most importantly, travelers are differentiated by their late-acceptance level, i.e. 
their willingness to be late, and the effects of various compositions of late-averse, late-tolerant and 
late-neutral travelers on congestion patterns with and without pricing are discussed. Similar to the 
bottleneck model, a bottleneck is assumed to exist immediately prior to the destination, yet the 
travel time from the origin to the bottleneck is no longer assumed to be constant, rather a 
probability distribution is considered which essentially introduces stochastic elements into the 
system rendering the arrival rate and queue size at the bottleneck random.  The queue evolution is 
modeled as a Markov-Poisson process following a similar approach employed in Daniel’s original 
development (Daniel 1992) and two pricing schemes are developed based on the expected 
marginal cost caused by the increased expected arrival rate upon a traveler’s selection of departure 
time.  These two schemes reflect two pricing perspectives: one is the omniscient perspective for 
which the transportation administrative agency is assumed to know each and every traveler’s cost 
structure (i.e., their detailed valuation of journey cost as well as early and late penalties), and the 
other observable perspective for which only queuing delay is considered.   
 
The organization of this paper is as follows. The formulation of the proposed model is detailed in 
Section 2.  In Section 3, the model is numerically tested using various scenarios with different 
traveler compositions and pricing schemes. The last section discusses implications and gives 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.  MODEL 
 
2.1. Model Assumptions 
Consider a situation where N travelers are planning their trips between their respective origins and 
a single destination with their desired arrival time uniformly distributed over a certain time period.  
Assume that there exists a bottleneck immediately before the destination with maximum queuing 
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capacity M and deterministic service time / service tv e h . At this bottleneck, travelers are served one at 
a time, and if more than two travelers arrive simultaneously, only one can be served immediately 
while others must wait in the queue, experiencing delays because of the fixed service rate.  Further, 
the travel time between the downstream end of the bottleneck and the destination is assumed 
negligible; an assumption similar to the original bottleneck model.  But unlike most conventional 
bottleneck models, the travel time from the origin to the bottleneck is no longer assumed constant 
(a travel time which is often neglected in the literature); rather it is assumed to be independent 
identically distributed random variable following a certain probability distribution characterized by 
meanµ , variance
2 σ , maximum  max t  and minimum min t . This means, travel time essentially has 
two components, (1) a random congestion-free component upstream of the bottleneck and (2) a 
queuing delay component (conditional on the number of vehicles) at the bottleneck. The 
independency of travel time from traveler to traveler for the congestion-free component can be 
understood as traveler coming from different neighborhoods converging on a bottleneck (e.g. a 
bridge), and thus select different routes from their particular origin to the bottleneck location and 
such route selections are unknown to each other.  Figure 1 illustrates the above assumptions. As 
shown in this figure, the total journey time from an origin to the destination is essentially the 
summation of the travel time from the origin to the bottleneck location, and the queuing delay plus 
a fixed service time at the bottleneck. In the figure, the queuing delay time at the bottleneck is 
described as “random” inasmuch as queue length at any given time of day is unpredictable. 
However, the queuing delay is deterministic insofar as service time per vehicle is deterministic.  
 
Importantly, in the proposed model, each traveler is characterized by their respective cost 
structures, i.e., the specific valuation of journey time, early and late penalties in relation to a 
desired arrival time.  Each traveler with a specific cost structure needs to select an “optimal” 
departure time such that the total trip cost is minimized. Because of the randomness of travel time 
and stochastic queue evolution at the bottleneck, the total travel cost for an individual traveler 
given a selected departure time is random as well. This means, each traveler has to select this 
departure time based on the expected total travel cost which is composed of expected journey cost 
plus expected late and early penalties. Determining the “best” departure time requires a tradeoff 
between journey cost, early and late penalties. For example, if a traveler chooses to depart early 
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enough to avoid possible congestion at the bottleneck, the traveler might experience less expected 
queuing delay but pay a higher expected early penalty. On the other hand, the late-departing 
traveler may be subject to higher expected late penalty that offsets the savings from journey cost 
and queuing delays. An important assumption here is that these N travelers make departure time 
selections simultaneously; their decisions of departure times are known to each other and thus in 
turn affect each other’s expected travel cost. Essentially this describes an N-player game and the 
optimal departure time for traveler n is therefore one such that the traveler cannot improve his 
expected travel cost by unilaterally changing it. 
 
 
Journey Travel Time from Origin to Destination
Queuing Delay Time at the Bottleneck(random) Travel Time from Origin to Bottleneck (random) Service Time (fixed)
 
 
Figure 1. N travelers model Diagram.  
There exists a bottleneck immediately before the destination. Total journey time is composed of travel time from the 
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2.2. Congestion Model Formulation 
 
The congestion model is formulated as follows. First, the time horizon is discretized by an interval 
equivalent to the bottleneck service time service t  and indexed by integers sequentially. Let  n D denote 
the selected departure time of traveler n, and  ( | ) nn p tD  denote the probability that traveler n who 
departs at  n D  actually arrives at the bottleneck at time t. With a total of N travelers, the expected 
bottleneck arrival rate at time t can be expressed as: 
 
  λ t ()= pn t | Dn ()
n=1
N
∑  (2.1) 
 
Let  () t q  denote  the  M+1-dimensional probability vector (M is the queuing capacity of the 




























q  (2.2) 
where ( ) i qt is the probability that at time t there are iqueuing vehicles at the bottleneck.  
 
If we assume only one queuing vehicle can be served at the beginning of each interval, then the 
dynamics of  () t q can be described using a Markov chain as  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 tt t += qQ q  (2.3) 
where ( ) t Q  is the transition matrix given as: 
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The element of transition matrix  ( ) t Q at row i  and  column  j , denoted as  ij Q , describes the 
probability that at time t there are j queuing vehicle while at time (t+1) the number of queuing 
vehicles becomes i, i.e.,  
 
     
Q(t) = Qij ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦,    Qij = P π t +1 ( )= i |π t ()= j { } ,i, j =1,2,...M  (2.5) 
 
where ( ) t π represents the number of bottleneck queuing vehicles at time t.   
  
Let  n J   denote the journey cost,  n E   the early penalty,  n L   the late penalty, and  n A  the  desired 
arrival time of traveler n, then the total travel cost for traveler n who departs the origin at  n D and 
arrives at the bottleneck at t can be expressed as: 
 
 
   








⎥+ En qk t ()
0≤k≤An−t
























    
The first term of the right hand side of Equation (2.6) is the expected journey cost of traveler n, 









⎣⎦ ∑ . Here the expected queuing cost is computed by averaging the waiting time 
over the probability distribution of the number of queuing vehicles at time t. Note the waiting time 
of traveler n equals the number of queuing vehicles because the time scale is discretized by the 
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⎣⎦ ∑ ,  k  
refers to both the number of queuing vehicle at the bottleneck at time t, as well as the queuing 
delay time the vehicle is about to experience (i.e., the number of intervals the vehicle has to wait in 
queue).  Similarly, the second and third term on the right hand side of Equation (2.6) give the 
expected cost of being early and expected cost of being late respectively in relation to the desired 
arrival time n A . 
 
User-optimal Departure Time Selection 
Immediately based on Equation (2.6) , the expected total personal cost (ETPC) of traveler n over 
all possible arrival time t can be expressed as    
  ( ) ( ) || nn n n n
t
ETPC p t D C t D =∑  (2.7) 
Traveler n  will select a departure time  n D to minimize expected total personal cost, i.e.,  
  () ()
* argmin | |
n
nn n n n
D
t
Dp t D C t D
⎛⎞
= ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑  (2.8) 
 
Equilibrium will be achieved when no traveler can lower expected total personal cost by 




12 ( , ,..., ,..., )
T
iN D DDD = uo D  (2.9) 
 
where  
   
 



















System-optimal Departure Time Selection 
 
The expected total social cost of N travelers is: 
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⎝⎠ ∑∑  (2.11) 


























Assuming the transportation administrative agency is omniscient about each individual traveler’s 
cost structure, i.e., the valuation of n J ,  n E and n L , as well as the desired arrival time  n A , for 
: 1,2,3,..., nN = , then a time-dependent “Omniscient” pricing scheme imposing congestion fee 















∂ ∑∑  (2.13) 
Clearly, this fee is equivalent to the expected increase in the costs of all travelers caused by 
increased expected arrival rate at time t.   It can be shown that  a time-dependent congestion fee as 
defined in Equation (2.13) will result in a departure pattern that minimizes the expected total 
social cost as defined in Equation(2.11).   To see this, note that the first order condition to 
minimize the expected total social cost defined in Equation (2.11) is  
 
1
(| ) (| )




nn n tn t
ETSC p t D C t D
CtD ptD n N
DD D =
∂∂ ∂
=+ =     ∀   =
∂∂ ∂ ∑∑ ∑  (2.14) 
Here the second term in (2.14) is the marginal increase in all travelers costs induced by the 
th n traveler’s departure time selection. 
 
When congestion fee  ( ) Ftis imposed, each traveler n will select a departure time  n D to minimize 
expected total personal cost; here traveler n’s total expected personal cost  n ETPC  including the 
congestion fee is expressed as:  
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 (| ) [ (| ) () ] nn n n n
t
ETPC p t D C t D F t
⎛⎞
=+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑  (2.15) 
Assume that individual travelers would treat their own cost  n C and the congestion fee  () F t  
parametrically and fix them to be constant when selecting departure time, then the first order 
condition for  n ETPC  to be minimized is: 
 
(| )




ETPC p t D
CtD F t n N
DD
∂∂
=+ =   ∀ =
∂∂ ∑  (2.16) 
 
Arrange Equation (2.16) to obtain the following:  
 
(| ) (| )
(| ) () 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . , nn n n n
nn
nn n tt
ETPC p t D p t D
CtD F t n N
DD D
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ∂∂ ∂
=+ =   ∀ = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ∑∑  (2.17) 
⇒
1
(| ) (| ) ( | )
(| ) (| )
()
N
nn n n n n n
nn n n
nn n tt n u
ETPC p t D p t D C u D
CtD puD
DD D t λ =
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
=+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ∑∑ ∑ ∑  
⇒
1
(| ) (| ) ( | )
(| ) (| )
()
N
nn n n n n n
nn n n
nn n tn u t
ETPC p t D p t D C u D
CtD puD
DD D t λ =
⎛⎞⎛ ⎞ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
=+ ⎜⎟⎜ ⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝⎠⎝ ⎠ ∑∑ ∑ ∑ 
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⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
=+ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ∑∑ ∑ ∑  
⇒  
1
(| ) ( | )
. ( | ) ( | ) , 1,2,...,
N
nn n n n
nn n n
nn n tn u
ETPC p t D C u D
CtD puD n N
DD D =
⎛⎞ ∂∂ ∂
=+     ∀ = ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ∑∑ ∑  (2.18) 
 
Equation (2.18) is essentially the same first order condition as Equation (2.14) for minimizing 
expected total social cost (ETSC) when no fee is imposed.  
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Usually an individual traveler’s cost structure is unobservable to the transportation administrative 
agency; hence a more realistic pricing scheme would only impose a congestion fee upon queuing 


















  (2.19) 
where 
0




= ∑  which is the queuing delay cost for traveler n. The congestion fee 
defined in Equation (2.19) essentially equals the marginal increase of queuing cost for all travelers 




Numerical Computation of Congestion Fee 















  in (2.13) and (2.19) are needed. These in turn boil down to the computation of 
()
, 1,2,..., ; 1, 2,...
()
k qu
kM u t t
t λ
∂
∀=    =+ +
∂
 Let  (t) Q'   denote the following matrix
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⎜⎟ ∂ ⎜⎟ ⎛⎞
∂ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂ =  , ∀ = + +
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
QQ Q Q '  (2.20) 
 
With (2.20) the congestion fees  ( ) Ft  and ( ) Ft    can be easily evaluated. Note the derivation 
approach is not original here but follows (Daniel, 1995). 
 
 
2.4. Algorithm to Find Equilibrium  
Under the proposed congestion and pricing model, a traveler’s expected total personal cost (ETPC) 
can be expressed as  ( | ) ( | ) nn nn
t
p tDCtD ∑   when no congestion fee is imposed, or 
(| ) [ (| ) () ] nn nn
t
p tD CtD Ft
⎛⎞
+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑ with omniscient pricing, or  ( | )[ ( | ) ( )] nn nn
t
p tD CtD Ft
⎛⎞
+ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑  with 
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observable pricing. Equilibrium results when no traveler can reduce expected total personal cost by 
unilaterally changing departure time.  This means, at equilibrium (
** * *
12 , ..., ,..., iN DD D D), 
1)  Without pricing: 
 
** * * * * * ' *
12 12 ( | ) ( | , ..., ,..., ) ( | ' ) ( | , ..., ,..., ), ', 1,2,..., ii i i N i i i i N i
tt
ptDCtD D D D ptD CtD D D D D i N ≤    ∀     = ∑∑   
 
2)  With omniscient pricing: 
** * * * * * ' *
12 12 ( | )[ ( | , ..., ,..., ) ( )] ( | ' )[ ( | , ..., ,..., ) ( )], ', 1,2,..., ii i i N i i i i N i
tt
ptD CtD D D D Ft ptD CtD D D D Ft D i N + ≤ +     ∀     = ∑∑
 
3)  With observable pricing:  
** * * * * * ' *
12 12 ( | )[ ( | , ..., ,..., ) ( )] ( | ' )[ ( | , ..., ,..., ) ( )], ', 1,2,..., ii i i N i i i i N i
tt
ptD CtD D D D Ft ptD CtD D D D Ft D i N + ≤ +     ∀     = ∑∑

 
Based on the above equilibrium conditions, a heuristic searching algorithm is developed in this 
paper for finding equilibrium points.  
 
Heuristic Equilibrium Searching Algorithm (HESA) 
Step 0:  
  Initialize departure time vector  D= ( 12 , ..., ,..., iN DD D D);  
  Compute the expected total personal cost vector 
123 ( , , ,..., ) N ETPC ETPC ETPC ETPC =
[0] ETPC   based on the initialized departure time 
vector; 
  Set n: =1 
Step 1:  
  For traveler n, keep  i D  constant for  1,2,..., , iN i n = ≠ ,  search for 
*
n D such that his 
expected total personal cost  is minimized;  
  Set 
*
nn DD =  
Step 2:  
  Set n:= n+1; 
  If n ≤ N   go to Step 1; else go to Step 3 
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Step 3:  
  Update the expected total personal cost vector based on the new departure time 
vector D resulting from Step 1 and Step 2; denote the updated new expected total 
personal cost vector 
[1] ETPC , 
  If  ||
[1] ETPC -
[0] ETPC 2 || <ε , stop; else set 
[0] ETPC =:
[1] ETPC  and go to Step 1. Here 
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3.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
 
The proposed congestion and pricing model has been implemented as a stand alone C++ program 
to facilitate the study of different congestion patterns in relation to various late-acceptance levels 
of travelers with and without pricing. It is important to clarify that here “late” is specifically in 
relation to a desired arrival time.  For the simulation experiment reported in this paper, the travel 
time distribution from the origin to the bottleneck location is assumed to be a Double Truncated 
Normal distribution
2
min max (, ; , ) DTN t t µσ , where µ  is the average, 
2 σ  variance,  min t  the minimum 
and  max t  the maximum value of this travel time. The coded program also allows other types of 
distribution such as Weibull or lognormal as well as user defined distributions.  
 
Specifically, in the simulation experiment, we assume 
   µ    =  15 min 
σ   =  10 min 
min t   =   5  min 
max t   =  25 min 
Total number of travelers     N  = 30  
Bottleneck queuing capacity M = 15 vehicles 
Bottleneck service time 1min /veh 
 
Also the feasible time horizon that a traveler can select a departure time from is assumed to be 
between 14:00 and 16:00 pm; and the desired arrival times uniformly distributed between 15:00 
and 15:15 pm.  
 
In addition, three types of travelers are distinguished: late-averse, late-tolerant and late-neutral 
travelers.  It is assumed late-averse travelers have higher penalties for being late than early, i.e., 
they are inclined to depart early in order to avoid the risk of being late. Similarly, late-tolerant 
travelers are assumed to have lower penalties for being late than early and late-neutral travelers 
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have identical early and late penalties. For simplicity, the results reported in this paper take the 
following settings for journey cost, early penalty and late penalty respectively: 
 
  Late-averse (late-averse) travelers:  J = 10, L = 20, E = 10 
  Late-tolerant (early-averse) travelers:  J = 10, L = 20, E = 40 
  Late-neutral travelers: J = 10, L = 20, E = 20 
 
Note that results with other parameter values produce similar results, and are omitted here due to 
space limitations.  
 
3.1. Congestion Pattern without Pricing 
 
Four different traveler compositions are considered when there is no pricing imposed:   
1)  all the travelers are late-averse (Figure 2); 
2)  all the travelers are late-tolerant (early-averse) (Figure 2); 
3)  all the travelers are late-neutral (Figure 3); 
4)  33.3% of the travelers are late-averse, 33.3% are late-tolerant and 33.3% are late-neutral 
(Figure 3); 
 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the congestion patterns under these scenarios. Specifically, Figure 2 
compares the congestion patterns under scenario 1 and scenario 2 as they represent two extreme 
situations.  As shown in Figure 2, when no pricing is imposed, under scenario 1 the congestion 
pattern is skewed towards the left (i.e., arriving early), while under scenario 2 the congestion 
pattern is more skewed towards the right, meaning travelers do not favor early departure.  These 
congestion patterns are expected, as under scenario 1 all travelers are late-averse travelers and they 
would try to avoid arriving late by selecting early departures. While under scenario 2 all travelers 
are late-tolerant travelers and they would not care so much about being late while they have high 
penalties for being early. In contrast to the “skewed” pattern in Figure 2, Figure 3 shows that when 
all the travelers are late-neutral or the three types of travelers are equally distributed (33.3% each), 
the congestion patterns are approximately symmetric around their desired arrival time.  Clearly, 
this is because when the late-acceptance level among travelers is equally distributed, the influence 
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of late-averse travelers and the influence of late-tolerant travelers on congestion pattern are 
offsetting each other, resulting in a similar pattern that can be achieved when all the travelers are 
late-neutral.  
 
Figure 2. Expected bottleneck arrival rate: a traveler population with 100% of late-averse travelers vs. a 
traveler population of 100 % late-tolerant travelers, no pricing 
 
 
Figure 3. Expected bottleneck arrival rate: a traveler population with 100% of late-neutral travelers vs. a 
traveler population with 33.3% of late-averse, 33.3% of late-tolerant and 33.3% of late-neutral travelers, no 
pricing 
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3.2. Congestion Pattern with Pricing 
 
Three different traveler compositions are considered when pricing (omniscient pricing or 
observable pricing) is imposed:   
 
1)  33.3% of the travelers are late-averse, 33.3% are late-tolerant and 33.3% are late-neutral 
(Figure 4); 
2)  all the travelers are late-averse (Figure 5); 
3)  all the travelers are late-tolerant (early-averse) (Figure 6); 
 
 
Figures 4, 5, and 6 illustrate the effects of different pricing schemes on congestion patterns. As is 
clearly illustrated, omniscient pricing is most effective in suppressing peak hour congestion and 
distributing demands over a longer time horizon. The observable pricing scheme is also effective, 
but because it is only based on queuing cost and ignores associated early or late penalties, 
congestion is suppressed but to a less extent. Additionally, one interesting observation is that 
congestion is more spread out (suppressed) with heterogeneous traveler composition (Figure 4) 
than with a single traveler-type composition (Figure 5 and Figure 6).  This seems to suggest that 
congestion pricing is most effective when travelers have diversified cost structures than when 
travelers have identical cost structures.  
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Figure 4. Congestion pattern: traveler population is composed of 33.3% late-averse, 33.3% late-tolerant 
and 33.3% late- neutral travelers, with pricing 
 
 
Figure 5. Congestion pattern: traveler population is composed of 100% late-averse travelers, with pricing 
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Figure 6. Congestion pattern: traveler population is composed of 100% late-tolerant travelers, with pricing 
 
 
3.3. Analysis of Impact on Social Cost and Revenue 
 
Table 1 summarizes the influence of different pricing schemes on Expected Total Social Cost 
(ETSC) excluding congestion fee (i.e., the cost structure doesn’t include congestion fee). As 
indicated from the table, the Expected Total Social Cost when congestion fee is excluded is 
minimized under omniscient pricing scheme. This is consistent with theoretical analysis that 
omniscient pricing minimizes Expected Total Social Cost excluding the congestion fee, as 
illustrated by Equations 1.14 and 1.18. However, the reduction of social cost from observable 
pricing to omniscient pricing varies with traveler compositions. When all travelers are late-averse, 
then the absolute reduction in social cost effected by omniscient pricing is not as significant as in 
other traveler compositions. Clearly, this suggests that the composition of traveler population 
directly influences the benefits a pricing scheme could ultimately effect; particularly this is true in 
extreme situation such as one with 100% late-averse travelers. 
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                             Composition 
Pricing Scheme 
33.3% of Each 
Type  






Baseline ETSC excluding 
congestion fee 
9298  8355 11351 9387 
Observable Pricing  2.17% 1.19% 2.27% 1.76% 
Omniscient Pricing   3.95% 1.37% 3.42% 3.59% 
Table 1. Expected Percentage Reduction in Total Social Cost Excluding Congestion Fee with Pricing  




Table 2 lists the Expected Total Social Cost with the addition of congestion fee under different 
pricing schemes. As can be seen from this table, when congestion fee is taken into account, 
omniscient pricing in general results in lower ETSC compared to observable pricing. In other 
words, omniscient pricing reduces Expected Total Social Cost. This is because cost savings 
effected by omniscient pricing offsets the addition of a congestion fee.  As the Expected Total 
Social Cost (with the addition of a congestion fee) is closely correlated with social welfare, the 
results in Table 2 imply that social welfare is generally improved with omniscient pricing vis-à-vis 
observable pricing. However, it has been noted that, when all the travelers are late-tolerant, the 
ETSC  (with the addition of congestion fee) resulting  from observable pricing is smaller than 
omniscient pricing.  Obviously in this case, the addition of a congestion fee exceeds the initial cost 
savings, so the use of the congestion fee becomes crucial to determining full welfare impacts. In 
particular, if revenue is returned to travelers, we get a different welfare outcome than when it is not. 
This once again suggests that extreme situations such as 100% late-averse or 100% late-tolerant 
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                             Composition 
Pricing Scheme 
33.3% of Each 
Type  






Baseline ETSC including 
congestion fee 
9298  8355 11351 9387 
Observable Pricing   15.82% 15.41% 14.39% 16.66% 
Omniscient Pricing  14.89% 10.33% 22.04% 15.81% 
Table 2. Expected Percentage Increase in Total Social Cost Including Congestion Fee with Pricing. (Revenue 
not returned to travelers.) 






Table 3 summarizes the revenues generated from tolling.  As can be expected, omniscient pricing 
in general generates more revenues because it considers the complete cost structure including 
journey cost and early/late penalties for individual travelers, while observable pricing only 
considers journey cost.  Also it is found that when all the travelers are risk averse, the revenue 
generated with omniscient pricing becomes less than observable pricing; yet Table 2 indicates the 
Expected Total Social Cost under omniscient pricing is still smaller than observable pricing. This 
seems to suggest that the amount of revenue generated by a certain pricing scheme cannot be 
employed as a sole indicator to assess the effectiveness of that pricing scheme and the ultimate 
benefits should be assessed comprehensively. This becomes even clearer when revenues are 
returned to travelers as equal shares (Table 4). 
   
                             Composition 
Pricing Scheme 
33.3% of Each 
Type  






Observable Pricing  1672 1386 1890 1729 
Omniscient Pricing   1751 977 2890  1820 
Table 3. Expected Revenue generated with different pricing schemes.  
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Table 4 presents the number of travelers that become better-off if revenues are returned as equal 
shares to each individual traveler. While overall social welfare improves more with omniscient 
pricing (Table 2), interestingly, with returned toll revenue more travelers are better off with 
observable pricing than omniscient pricing in each case. This may be explained because 
omniscient pricing redistributes travel demand more significantly; as a consequence, the 
congestion pattern is more spread out such that some travelers choose to depart very early while 
some choose to depart very late, resulting in a broader range of travel costs distribution as 
compared to observable pricing.  
 
                             Composition 
Pricing Scheme 
33.3% of Each 
Type  




100%  Late 
Neutral 
Observable Pricing  28 24 30 30 
Omniscient Pricing   27 20 24 26 
Table 4. Number of travelers with improved personal welfare if an equal share of revenue is returned to each 
traveler (30 travelers in total)
Xin, Wuping and D. Levinson (2007) Stochastic congestion and pricing model with endogenous departure time selection and heterogeneous travelers 
(07-1035) presented at the 86th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board in Washington, DC, January 21-25 2007  24
 
4.  SUMMARY 
 
This paper proposes a stochastic congestion and pricing model that takes into account travelers 
endogenous departure time selections. Under this model travelers are assumed to have a uniformly 
distributed desired arrival time for a given OD pair, and each traveler selects the “best” departure 
time to minimize expected total personal cost, which is the summation of journey cost, early 
penalty and late penalty and congestion fee.  Two pricing schemes reflect two different 
assumptions about knowledge on the part of the tolling agency: one is an omniscient perspective 
for which the transportation administrative agency is assumed to know each and every traveler’s 
cost structure (i.e., their detailed valuation of journey cost as well as early and late penalties), and 
the other observable perspective for which only queuing delay is considered.  The effects of 
different pricing schemes on congestion pattern with varied late-averse, late-tolerant and late-
neutral travelers compositions are explored.  Numerical simulation suggests that the omniscient 
pricing scheme is most effective in suppressing peak hour congestion and distributing demands 
over longer time horizon. Also congestion is reduced when the traveler composition is 
heterogeneous.  This suggests that congestion pricing is more effective when travelers have 
diversified cost structures than identical cost structures.  In addition, the simulation results indicate 
that when compared to observable pricing omniscient pricing in general reduces Expected Total 
Social Cost (with or without the addition of congestion fee); this implies social welfare could be 
improved with omniscient pricing vis-à-vis observable pricing. However more travelers improve 
welfare individually with observable rather than omniscient pricing. The ultimate benefits of any 
pricing scheme depend on traveler cost structure as well as the composition of late-tolerant, late-
averse and late-neutral travelers in the entire population.  
 
Finally, it is worthwhile to stress that the above conclusions are based on numerical simulations 
and have not been proven here in a general sense.  The effect of heterogeneity of traveler 
compositions is not easy to determine a priori, especially without comprehensive sensitivity 
analysis. This is because heterogeneity affects costs both with and without tolling, and the welfare 
impact of tolling depends on the difference in costs.  Some earlier studies with the deterministic 
bottleneck model (e.g., Cohen 1987; Arnott et al. 1994) have shown that the welfare impacts of 
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congestion pricing depend on the relative magnitude of heterogeneity in the cost function 
parameters. Daniel (2001) found that heterogeneity of costs tends to improve the welfare-
distributional impacts of congestion pricing. These earlier findings are consistent with the study in 
this paper while comprehensive sensitivity tests of the model are currently underway by the 
authors to enable drawing more general conclusions from the model.  In addition, it should be 
mentioned that Arnott and Kraus (1998) showed that if tolls can be varied freely over time and 
travelers cannot overtake each other, anonymous tolls (i.e., tolls that are independent of traveler 
type) suffice to support a system optimum; also with pure bottleneck queuing congestion the 
optimal toll should be able to eliminate queuing while maintaining capacity flow through the 
bottleneck. However, in this study, the observable toll performs less well than the omniscient toll. 
This can be attributed to fact that the arrival rate of vehicles at the queue is not deterministic as in 
the basic bottleneck model but random.  
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